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This paper investigates the EU’s international positioning in terms of innovative capabilities and global market 
performance by using most recent quantitative data on a wide branch of indicators. The EU’s performance is 
compared to the standings of its most important economic competitors and emerging economic powerhouses: the 
USA, Japan, China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. By doing so, this paper offer insightful and deep 
information about the EU’s power to compete and rank in international economic affairs. It will be proofed that 
the European Union ranks in many of the indicators related to innovative capabilities in good position and the 
EU’s overall global market performance is excellent, whereas the BRICS are underachieving.  
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Introduction
1 
“Becoming an innovative country”, “being an innovative entity”, “staying innovative in a competitive 
environment”; phrases like those are on nearly every politician’s lips when talking about innovation 
policy and the importance of innovation for the global standing of their political entity. In the last decade, 
there has been a real surge of strategy papers in the European Union (EU), official documents, think tank 
publications and policy outlines that stress the importance of knowledge, and innovation policy for the 
European  Union’s  international  rank  in  terms  of  economic  competitiveness  and  political  leverage. 
Already has the European Commission’s (EC) Lisbon Strategy put a special emphasis on the significance 
of  knowledge  and  innovation  and  the  current  Europe  2020  strategy  (European  Commission  2010a) 
stresses the importance of a knowledge and innovation based society for sustainable, long-lasting and 
enduring economic growth even more. Based on the finding, that innovation and knowledge are one, or 
maybe the, condition for economic growth and the power to compete in today’s competitive international 
economic environment, the EU has set up a variety of support programs and funding lines to foster public 
knowledge infrastructure development, innovative capabilities, technological advancement and private 
innovation over the last years.
2 Obviously it can be considered highly important for a political entity/actor 
to know something about its comparative international standing in regard to its innovative capabilities and 
market performance in terms of the ability to compete. Thus, the aim of this paper is to deliver some 
answers on the question “Where does the EU stand in regard of her innovative capabilities and market 
performance in comparison to other industrialized and emerging political entities?”  
Especially  in  the  light  of  the  ongoing  debate  of  a  (possible)  power  shift  from  traditional  industrial 
countries to emerging powers, the question of the EU’s international standing seems to be even more 
important.  But  this  paper  will  not  only  be  able  to  evaluate  the  EU’s  international  standing  in  a 
comparative way, but it will also – as a kind of “side effect” – help us to understand if the status of the 
traditional industrialized countries is challenged by the emerging powers at all, by just some of them or in 
general.  
It should be made clear, that the aim of this paper is not to develop a way out of the ongoing theoretical 
dispute on the general ontology of innovation, or to find a new theoretical path towards the understanding 
of the relation of power and innovation.  
This paper is designed to investigate the EU’s international positioning by using most recent quantitative 
data  on  different  indicators,  which  the  authors  consider  of  crucial  importance  for  the  innovative 
capabilities and market performance of a political entity. The EU’s performance in terms of its innovative 
capabilities and market performance will be compared to the standings of its most important economic 
competitors and emerging  economic  powerhouses: the  USA, Japan,  China,  Brazil,  India,  Russia  and 
                                                           
1 The authors would like to thank Joaquin Roy, Astrid Boening, Maximilian Mayer and Jan-Paul Franken for their 
helpful comments and ideas, the most valuable assistance regarding the collection of data of Matthias Haget and 
Thomas Kuller is also most gratefully acknowledged. The authors also would like to appreciate the inspiration by 
Xuewu Gu and the Center for Global Studies’ research group on “Rising Knowledge Power”. Jan-Frederik Kremer 
also would like to express his thankfulness to the University of Miami and the European Union Center for the 
support during his stay as short-term visiting scholar.    
2 Most well-known the Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development, but also smaller 
programs like the Programme for the Competitiveness of enterprises and SMEs (COSME) and the Innovation Union 
Strategy, cf.: European Commission 2005, 2006a; EC 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. For a more general overview about the 
EU’s innovation/knowledge policy and their impact, see: Stajano 2009; Soriano and Mulatero 2010 and Muldur 
2006. 2 
 
South Africa. By doing so, this paper will offer insightful and deep information about the EU’s power to 
compete and rank in international economic affairs for a wide range of indicators, based on latest data.     
To do so, in a first step (chapter I) some general theoretical remarks on the importance of innovation and 
innovative capabilities for the international standing of an political actor/entity/state will be made, with a 
special focus on existing theoretical validations of the relevance of innovation for an entity’s economic 
performance and intentional standing shared by the authors. Further, a working definition of innovative 
capabilities will be presented.  
In a second step (chapter II), after some general remarks on the selection of the different indicators, the 
data on the EU’s innovative capabilities and market performance will be presented and analyzed.  
To conclude, the European Union ranks in many of the indicators related to innovative capabilities in 
good  position  and  the  EU’s  overall  global  market  performance is excellent,  whereas the  BRICS  are 
underachieving. Despite the challenges the EU faces today, it becomes obvious that the good standing of 
the EU is owed to the fact that the EU is regarded in its entirety, which should provide another argument 
for further European integration.  
I.  Innovation,  Innovative  Capabilities  and  their  Importance  for  the 
International Standing of an Entity  
Writing  about  the  importance  of  knowledge  and  innovation  for  entities’  competitiveness,  economic 
performance and power positioning in global affairs has become immensely en vogue over the last years. 
Countless  publications  in  scientific  journals  and  magazines  discuss  and  try  to  grasp  the  ontological 
character of knowledge and/or innovation, possible theoretical linkages between them and their influence 
on  states’  and/or  entities’  international  economical  and  political  performance.
3  Further,  a  body  of 
literature in economics and development studies stresses the importance of states’ knowledge and/or 
innovation capabilities for economic development and growth.
4 Most recently scholarly work in IR has 
once again refocused its activity prominently on the relations between states’ (structural) power and 
knowledge:
5 some works argue for a strong link between knowledge and power (Paarlberg 2004); others 
question the general idea of a relationship of that kind (especially works of the critical school). In the 
1980s Susan Strange showed already how states’ power and knowledge are related and how knowledge 
affects states’ structural power (Strange 1987 and 1988: 115-133). Or, as Grieco and Ikenberry put it: 
“Nations-States  emerged  in  the  modern  world  within  a  competitive  state  system  that  rewarded 
governments that had access to a thriving economy. The power of the state has always been ultimately 
dependent on the wealth and productivity of the society of which it is a part” (Ibd: 9) and this productivity 
and wealth has always been related to the innovative capabilities of the state’s economy (Ibd: 9-14, see 
also Cantwell 2004). On the other hand, a different branch of scholars in IR has uncovered the theoretical 
relationship between the possession of specific rare and highly processed economic goods and political 
power (most prominently: Hirschman 1947 (1980), more recently Co 2012; Kremer 2011a; Norrlof 2010; 
Anderson  et  al.  2000),  or  on  the  effect  of  global  asymmetries  between  states  in  terms  of  their 
technological endowment (Baldwin 1980; Nye and Keohane 2001; Pustovitovskij and Kremer 2012). In 
modern economic theories of trade and growth there is no doubt about the importance of the factors 
technology, knowledge and innovation for the competitiveness and economic power of a state (cf. Aghion 
                                                           
3 See for example the publications by Castellacci and Archibugi 2008; Fischer 2011; Stehr 2001, that in one or the 
other ways try to address those questions and problems.  
4 See here exemplary: Hauque 1995; Stajano 2009; Frietsch and Schüller 2010; Fagerberg and  Srholec 2008; Lall 
1987; Fagerberg 1987 and 1988. 
5 Cf.: Mytelka 2000; CGS-Forschungsgruppe Wissensmacht 2011; Below et al. 2012.  3 
 
and  Howitt  1998;  Sachs  2002;  Trebilcock  and  Howse,  2012:  chapter  I,  Grieco  and  Ikenberry  2003: 
chapter I and II). Although there are different points of view regarding the question of how to understand 
and explain this correlation on a theoretical level, most of the today’s research agree that knowledge and 
innovation are of essential importance for the global standing and the economic performance of states and 
political entities like the EU and various studies in IR and economics have proven this relationship p.e. 
for the case of China’s economic and political rise (p.e. Altenburg 2008). 
Therefore  this  paper  follows  the  basic  assumption,  that  a  good  performance  in  terms  of  innovative 
capabilities - whereas innovative capabilities are defined as those indicators in the areas of investment & 
human resources, infrastructure and research-productivity that can be identified as pre-conditional to 
gain and sustain competitiveness and leadership in technology and advanced products - is the necessary 
but not sufficient condition for a superior global (market) performance and one important condition for 
power to compete.  
Although we cannot claim that there is an undoubted universally valid theoretical causal relationship 
between innovative capabilities and market performance, the existing body of literature and illustrated 
examples of empirical research clearly show that the availability of certain innovative capabilities can be 
seen as the necessary but not sufficient condition for the supreme market performance of an entity.   
II. Innovative Capabilities and Market Performance of the European Union 
As shown above, the innovative capabilities of an entity are of essential importance for its power to 
compete and its international standing in today’s interdependent and interconnected global economic and 
political environment. Therefore, also for the EU with its large single market and intensified political, 
economic and monetary integration among the member states (like the EMU, Fiscal Compact, CSDP, 
common  trade  policy  etc.),  the  ability  to  gain  and  maintain  innovative  capabilities  is  of  crucial 
importance. Without engaging in the still ongoing debate about the general quality of the EU’s actorness, 
most of the recent research on the EU consents that at the latest after the Lisbon-Treaty the EU can be 
ascribed the status of actorness in international relations (Verola 2010; Woolcock 2010).
6 Article 47 of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly recognizes the legal personality of the European Union 
(EU) and the ability of the EU to conclude and negotiate international agreements in accordance with its 
external  commitments,  to  become  a  member  of  international  organizations  and  to  join  international 
conventions, which are undoubtedly attributes related to actorness in international law. For example, in 
the case of the EU’s international trade policy and its engagement in the governance of international 
economic  relations,  there  is  wide  consensus  about  the  EU’s  state-like  actorness  among  scholars 
(Woolcock 2010; Nottebaum 2011; Kremer 2011b; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005; Meunier 2006, 2007). 
Therefore, this paper follows the vast majority of recent research on the actorness of the EU and emanates 
that the EU can be seen as a state-like actor in most of the sectors of international affairs. Considering the 
evident importance of the EU as state-like actor in various domains of international relations, an analysis 
of the EU’s innovative capabilities and market performance seems not only justified, but necessary to 
assess  Europe’s  standing  in  global  economic  affairs.  Furthermore,  considering  the  immense  and 
exceedingly  integrated  single  market  and  the  overwhelming  importance  of  the  EU’s  internal  market 
governance and regulation, as well as its growing importance in foreign affairs (trade policy, international 
climate/environmental governance etc.), once more it seems more than necessary to asses innovative 
                                                           
6 Cf. for example: Bindi 2010 for a more general assessment of the EU’s external activities in historical perspective; 
Edwards 2011; Hill and Smith (eds.) 2011 (edited volume on the hole branch of the EU’s external activity); Smith 
2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; EC 2007a, 2007b for the EC’s position on the international importance of 
the EU’s single market and its implications for the EU more generally). 4 
 
capabilities and market performance on an European level (which most of the research, by sticking to the 
member  states,  does  not).  This  task  is  done  in  this  chapter,  in  which  we  look  into  the  innovative 
capabilities of the EU and its market performance by using a wide set of indicators, as shown in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Innovative Capabilities and Market Performance – Indicators 
Innovative Capabilities of the European Union  
As  mentioned  in  chapter  I,  innovative  capabilities  are  defined  as  those  indicators  in  the  areas  of 
investment & human resources, infrastructure and research-productivity that can be identified as pre-
conditional to gain and sustain competitiveness and leadership in technology and advanced products and 
in  our  understanding  are  the  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  a  superior  global  (market) 
performance as well as one important condition for the power to compete. In this part of the paper the 
innovative capabilities of the EU will be assessed. 
 
Investment & Human Capital  
In  this  section  indicators  have  been  selected  that  give  profound  insight  into  the  share  of  resources 
allocated to education and the overall amount of resources spend on education and the development of 
human resources. Of course, resources and money spent on education do not in every case translate into 
more innovation and higher competitiveness per se, but nevertheless multiple studies (cf. Lucas 1988; 
Barro 1991, 1997; Bassanini and Scarpetta 2001; Romer 1994; Pfeffer 1994; Temple 1999) have proved a 
statically  correlation  between  investment  in  education/human  capital  and  economic  growth  in  gross 
national product (GNP), even though on a theoretical level a clear causal relationship is hard to establish. 
For  example,  literature  in  development  studies  and  on  economic  growth,  starting  with  neo-classical 
Innovative Capabilities  Market Performance 
 
Investment & Human Capital:  
Public spending on education (% of GDP) 
Public  spending  on  education  and  expenses-
population ratio 
School enrollment tertiary (% gross) 
Infrastructure: 
Fixed (wired) internet subscriptions  
Fixed broadband internet subscribers 
THE Top-200 global universities by quarter 
Research-Productivity:  
Scientific journal articles 
Citations 
Patents applications by country of origin 
Total Number of Patent Families by Country of 
Origin  
Royalty and license fees balance 
Forbes Global 2000 
Merchandise trade performance 
Commercial serv. trade performance  5 
 
growth models, the so-called endogenous growth models (for example Aghion and Howitt 1998), which 
are still broadly used and current new-growth theories (that underline the importance of human capital for 
economic growth; cf. Nelson 2005, esp. 115-139) evidently show a correlation between public spending 
on education, the development of human resources and economic growth.
7 Altogether there is strong 
evidence that high expenditures on education (in comparison to other entities; p.e. measurable by Public 
Spending on education, absolute 2011 in billion € and expenses-population ratio) increase the economy’s 
power  to  compete  as  well  as  its  productivity  and  leads  to  a  higher  national  growth  rate  (cf.  for  an 
overview Wilson and Brisco 2004). Therefore, spending on education and the availability of a well-
trained  and  educated  labor  force large in  numbers (measurable  for  example by  using  tertiary  school 
enrollment  rate)  is  apparently  of  huge  importance  for  an  entity’s  economic  performance  and  it  is 
necessary to examine it more closely.   
 
 
 
“Public spending on education” includes all spending for educational institutions (public and private) by 
the government and transfers/subsides for private entities (students, households etc.). Regarding public 
spending on education (% of GDP, see chart 1) the EU finds itself in an upper class position and leveled 
with the USA, Brazil and South Africa. Japan, Russia and India are well behind the leading group. For 
China, there is no consistent data form trustworthy international sources available; most of the literature 
on China’s educational systems assumes a public spending rate on education of 4% (2010).  
 
Chart 1: Public Spending on Education (% of GDP) 
 
 
Consequently in terms of public spending on education in % of the GDP the EU is well positioned 
internationally and accomplishes one requirement for maintaining a superior educational system, even 
though there are huge differences between the member states (p.e. for 2009: Finland 6.8%, France 5.9%, 
Germany 4.6%, Spain 5.0%, Italy 4.7%, Poland 5.1%, Portugal 5.8%). 
 
                                                           
7 Sylwester 2000 p.e. has shown that today’s public spending on education is related to future economic growth.  
Public Spending on education (% GDP) 
EU efforts in public spending on education in upper-middle class, in terms of % of GDP. Pole position 
in public spending on education in absolute terms.    6 
 
 
 
It is not sufficient for one actor, in ordr to catch up with the leading political entities in education, to 
spend a higher, respectively at least equal number of resources (in regard to % of GDP) on education. 
Instead, it is necessary to spend (in comparison to other entities) a comparable amount of money on 
education in relation to the population size. That’s why the authors have developed a more sophisticated 
indicator, the public spending on education expenses-population ratio (chart 2), to assess the standing in 
matter of measuring the resources allocated to the educational system. 
The public spending on education expenses-population ratio indicates the virtual amount of money that 
the respective governments spend per capita on education in one year (in US$, 2010). As we can learn 
from chart 2, the absolute top-spenders for educational purposes with a huge advance, both in terms of the 
absolute amount of money spent (USA: ap. 815bn$ p.a., EU: ap. 1010bn$ p.a.), and in terms of the more 
important indicator, the virtual amount of money spent per capita (USA: 2592$ p.a., EU: 2005$ p.a.), are 
the USA and EU.  
 
Chart 2: Public Spending on education, absolute 2011 in billion € and expenses-population ratio 
 
 
In the light of the fact, to catch-up with the front row’s entities the absolute amount of money and the 
virtual amount of money spent per capita matters, the only other entity, which can also be considered to 
be in good position is Japan (225bn$ p.a.; 1763 per capita). China and India underachieve visibly in both 
categories (China: 292bn$ p.a. / 216$ per capita; India 145bn$ p.a. / 119$ per capita), whereas Brazil, 
Russia and South Africa find themselves in mid-field positions with still a lot of air left between them and 
the US, EU and Japan.         
 
To sum up, in terms of resources allocated to the educational system, the EU can be ranked second and is 
in a good position, but additional efforts are needed in order to uphold this leading position and to close-
up to the USA.  
Public Spending on education, absolute 2011 in billion € and expenses-population ratio 
EU and USA superior. Japan in good position. BRICS doing poor.    7 
 
 
 
As outlined above the formation and development of advanced human capital is another factor that is 
important for economic growth and international competitiveness of political entities. Numerous studies 
stress the importance of a well-trained and educated labor force for acquiring and effectively organizing 
the use of complex knowledge and skills, respectively economic growth in general (cf. p.e. Castellacci 
and Archibugi 2008: 1661; Cohen and Soto 2007; Barro 2001: 14-16). Like Barro (2001: 14) puts it: 
“…more human capital facilitates the absorption of superior technologies from leading countries” and 
therefore  is  one  pre-condition  for  economic  growth.  The  enrollment  rate  in  tertiary  education 
(International Standard Classification of Education category 5 and 6) is a useful indicator to measure the 
development and availability of human capital. As the data indicates, the EU and Japan take mid-field 
positions in regard to the tertiary school enrollment rate, whereas the USA and Russia occupy the top-
positions and India, China and Brazil perform poorly.  
 
Chart 3: School enrollment tertiary (% gross) 
 
 
 
The very high rate of tertiary school enrollment in the US and Russia has to be understood in the light of 
entirely different systems of vocational education in those countries and most of the EU’s member states 
(like Germany, France, Austria, Denmark Slovenia and the Netherlands): Whereas for example in the 
USA  most  of  the  vocational  training  is  situated  at  community  colleges,  undergraduate  university 
programs and adult education centers, that are classified as higher education level ISCED-5, a good 
number of the vocational training in Europe (but also in China) is done by institutions like the dual 
education system, which are not leveled ISCED-5 or 6, but deliver at least the same quality of education. 
Therefore, the mid-field position of the European Union in terms of tertiary education enrollment does not 
necessarily  offer  precise  information  about  the  EU’s  more  general  performance  in  human  capital 
development and formation. Taking into account these differences, the EU finds itself in a good ranking 
regarding its availability and development of advanced human capital. 
 
School enrollment tertiary (% gross) 
USA: Highest enrollment rates (% gross), Russia, EU and Japan do well. Brazil, China and India 
catch up slowly.  8 
 
Summary “Investment & Human Capital”: In all three indicators (public spending on education (% of 
GDP); public spending on education and expenses-population ratio; school enrollment tertiary) the EU 
finds itself in an upper-class position, but not in one indicator in the prime spot. Especially in terms of 
tertiary  education  enrollment  rate  the  EU  trails  and  there  are  more  efforts  needed  to  maintain 
competitiveness and the availability of advanced human capital in the future. Opposing the general public 
perception, the BRICS countries do not do that well in terms of investment and human capital as they 
would have to do to catch up, or even overtake the industrialized actors.    
 
Infrastructure 
Innovation process does not only require investment, but also a well-developed infrastructure. A central 
characteristic of knowledge and – as long as it is not limited by patents – scientific discovery is non-
rivalness. This means that everybody can benefit from the advancement of knowledge without depriving 
others  of  this  knowledge  (Sachs  and  McArthur  2002:  170).  This  characteristic  enables  scientific 
cooperation, competition and advancement, but nevertheless requires certain infrastructural facilities. The 
sharing of knowledge, discovery and scientific data is thus heavily linked to the modern data storage and 
communication  possibilities  of  the  Internet.  Moreover,  “creating  innovation  system  requires  creating 
scale” (Sachs and Mc Arthur 2002: 171). Scientists that are able to cooperate with others within their 
working environment will produce much more scientific output and progress than isolated scientists. A 
well-developed network of national universities encourages research cooperation between scientists and 
provides a sound frame for innovation and research output in a variety of scientific fields (Sachs and 
McArthur  2002:  170).  The  selected  indicators  in  the  following  section  thus  take  into  account  the 
importance of infrastructural facilities for the innovation process such as Internet accessibility and the 
structure of national university systems. 
 
Fixed (wired) Internet subscriptions and Fixed broadband internet subscribers 
The emerging man-made environment of cyberspace has already changed existing power relations and 
societal life during the last years. Its facilities, such as Internet use, became a crucial feature for states and 
societies to innovate and catch-up (Fagerberg and Srholec 2008: 1420). “Societies around the world (…) 
are heavily dependent on globally networked technologies. They have been locked in and interpenetrated 
by a digital web of their own spinning” (Deibert and  Rohozinski 2010: 12). Making money and business 
in our times has become dependent on the interconnectedness made possible by  the Internet and the 
cyberspace. Because of modern data storage possibilities and the ability to connect people on far sides of 
the globe, the Internet facilitates the exchange of scientific research results and experimental data. Internet 
access also enables researchers to connect and shifts the local next-door-communication of scientists to a 
global digital scale (Cf. Parachissi 2002; Sachs and McArthur 2002: 172f.). Because of the illustrated 
importance  of  Internet  access,  the  indicators  of  fixed  (wired)  Internet  subscriptions  as  well  as  fixed 
broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) have been selected to give profound insight into the 
performance of Internet infrastructure within the selected countries. 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
The empirical data on fixed Internet subscriptions shows a highly developed Internet infrastructure for the 
European Union, the United States, and China. Japan trails far behind these leading countries in terms of 
the total number of Internet subscriptions, but this empirical data is highly influenced by the population 
size. 
Chart 4: Fixed (wired) Internet Subscriptions 
 
Chart 5: Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) 
 
Fixed (wired) internet subscriptions  
EU, USA, Japan, Brazil and China on good levels. EU and US still in leading position. India, South 
Africa and Russia disastrous. 
Fixed broadband internet subscribers 
EU, USA and Japan on top. Brazil, Russia and China are catching up. India and South-Africa badly 
positioned and without improvements.  10 
 
In relative terms of fixed broadband and Internet subscribers per 100 people, Japan is even one of the 
leading countries together with the European Union and the United States. China seems to have a well-
developed Internet infrastructure in total numbers of Internet subscriptions, but if the relative number of 
fixed broadband Internet subscribers is taken into account, China is on a low infrastructural level among 
the other BRICS states. 
The development and the status quo of Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa is ambivalent, surprising 
and alarming. Brazil succeeded in tripling its total number of Internet subscriptions from 2007 to 2008 
and the relative number of fixed broadband Internet subscribers also increased during the last years. This 
is due to great investments and efforts made by the government. Dozens of programs have been initiated 
to connect the population to the Internet. In 2010 a National Broadband Plan was launched that should 
even triple broadband access by 2014 (Kelly and Cook 2011: 66-67). A similar situation presents itself in 
Russia. The country has succeeded in developing sound Internet infrastructure for both indicators. There 
have also been some efforts to improve the amount of Internet penetration in Russia. The Ministry of 
Education  and  Science  has  launched  national  programs  that  provide  Internet  access  to  all  national 
educational institutions as well as to install open source software on every school computer. But the 
situation is ambivalent, because Internet and PC penetration is much higher in Moscow and St. Petersburg 
than in the rest of the country, especially in the rural areas (ONI 2010: 211-212). India and South-Africa 
are badly positioned for both indicators and without improvements during the last years. Even though 
governmental initiatives, such as the South African National Research Network, have tried to increase and 
speed  up  Internet  connections  for  South  African  researchers,  the  situation  is  still  bad.  People  and 
especially researcher and students that are heavily dependent on Internet facilities face high costs of 
Internet access. This structure poses a serious impediment to research and development in South Africa. 
The situation of the worldwide leading country of IT-experts, India, seems to be disastrous. In 2010 0.89 
out of 100 people were fixed broadband Internet subscribers. But it is difficult to evaluate this situation, 
because India may become one of the first mobile digital societies, a digital dimension that cannot be 
measured by the indicators of broadband Internet subscriptions. Even if mobile Internet user access has 
tripled from 2007 to 2009, when it increased from 4mio to 12mio users, it is still a very low number. 
Nevertheless, there is a high importance of broadband Internet infrastructure especially for rural areas and 
measures  to  achieve  a  higher  general  availability  of  broadband  Internet  are  taken  with  the  National 
Broadband Plan (Cf. Telecom Regulatory Authority Of India 2010a; Aguiar et al. 2010: 7-11).  
The European Union is one of the leading entities both in terms of fixed (wired) Internet subscriptions as 
well as fixed broadband Internet subscribers per 100 people. Like the EC points out in her “Digital 
Agenda  for  Europe”
8  (one  of  the  seven  flagship  initiatives  of  the  Europe  2020  Strategy):  “The 
development of high-speed networks today is having the same revolutionary impact as the development of 
electricity and transportation networks had a century ago”
9 and the internet today is the most important 
medium  for  business,  innovation  and  economic  growth  and  social  progress  (European  Commission 
2010b: 3-4 and 2010c: 8-10). Therefore one aim of the “Digital Agenda for Europe” is to increase the 
number of broadband internet subscribers significantly and step-by-step to a 100% coverage by 2030. In 
comparison to other political entities (as the data indicates), the EU is already in good position regarding 
internet accessibility, one additional condition for fine global competitiveness (especially in ICT related 
business activity).   
 
                                                           
8 Cf.: European Commission. 2010b: 3-6.   
9 Ibd.: 4. 11 
 
 
Innovation  process  is  foremost  science  based  and  depends  heavily  on  the  quality  and  infrastructural 
characteristics of the national higher educational system. The indicators in the cluster of Investment and 
Human Resources have already shown the importance of investment in the higher education system, but a 
second meaning is accorded to a structural dimension. A well-developed national structure of high quality 
universities offers the possibility to train a great number of students as well as to allocate high-class 
researchers. Moreover, excellent research facilities create innovation in a variety of scientific disciplines. 
This structural dimension enables the country to address and frame urgent scientific problems as well as 
to dominate the global scientific discourse (Below et al. 2012: 16-17).   
 
Chart 6a: World’s University Ranking – Times Higher Education 
 
 
 
Universities in the European Union and the United States are leading the Times Higher Education (THE) 
World's University Ranking in terms of the total number of universities. This is not surprising considering 
the long academic tradition of these countries as well as the annual budget of the leading universities. 
Most of the world-leading institutions like Harvard, Princeton or Yale University were founded in the 
17th and 18th century. The foundation of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge can even be dated 
back to the 12th and 13th century. Moreover the annual financial endowment of the top 15 universities of 
the THE university ranking accounts for more than 1bn US$. The creation and maintenance of material 
resources include high-technology research facilities such as particle accelerators at the University of 
California, Massachusetts Institute of Technology or Cornell University that also require a great amount 
of annual investment. The important universities in Europe and the United States with their long research 
tradition benefit from a large body of experience as well as their global reputation to strengthen research 
and train students. They benefit from large annual investments and are able to lead the global scientific 
discourse. It is thus extremely difficult for newly founded research institutions in emerging economies to 
catch up with these world leading institutions in a couple of years. 
Some  national  universities  in  China,  India  or  Brazil  such  as  the  Chinese  Nanjing  University  or  the 
Brazilian Federal University of Rio de Janeiro have also been founded over a century ago and national 
THE Top-200 global universities 
European  universities  on  top,  USA  directly  behind  and  catching  up.  Japan  and  China  mediocre. 
Brazil, Russia, India and SA not worth mentioning 12 
 
governments have recently started to spend a huge amount to strengthen their capabilities (Below et al. 
2012). But universities tend to increasingly compete in a global environment in the future (Buela-Casal et 
al. 2007: 350) and significant quality and financial problems still exist in universities especially in China 
and India: “Many of India’s impressive number of engineering graduates (…) are too poorly educated to 
function effectively in the economy without additional on-the-job training” (Altbach 2009: 180). The 
expenditure per student for academic formation in the BRICS states is still high and they suffer from the 
“brain drain” to high-class research institutions in the United States or Europe that open up long-term 
prospects for the students (Below et al. 2012: 16-18). 
The question that is left is about Japan's standing within this university ranking. As a highly developed 
country and leading economy in the world, it only seems to possess a handful of excellent universities. 
One answer might be that Japan's investment in the higher education system has been focused too long on 
national  initiatives. Thus, Japanese  universities  dominate  regional  university  rankings,  but  have  only 
found a bad position in the global university league (Yonezawa 2006). The government started to invest 
in the internationalization of its universities a couple of years ago and academics “have [even] launched a 
Flagship Universities project to identify a few major Japanese universities and develop them as ‘world-
class universities’” (Deema, Mokb and Lucasa 2008: 90). 
 
Chart 6b: World’s University Ranking by Quarter – Times Higher Education 
 
 
 
As the assessment of the indicator has proved, the EU finds itself in the second place, behind the USA, 
related to the total number of world’s top universities. The USA has a significant larger share in numbers 
of the world’s top 50 universities. But, like the indicator has also shown, if cutting the top 200 universities 
of the THE World's University Ranking in quarters, an interesting shift between the European Union and 
the United States can be observed: The United States still face the top-ranking positions, but European 
universities seem to catchup. Especially in the context of the recently intensified efforts
10 of the European 
Union  and  of  several  governments  of  the  member  states  (p.e.  the  German  Universities  Excellence 
Initiative)  to  support  and  promote  European  universities  and  public  research  facilities,  the  obvious 
catching up of European universities has to be considered as one first sign of success of Europe’s rally to 
the top. Furthermore, due to the fact, that rankings of higher education do not include public funded 
research institutes - like the Leibniz Scientific Community (endowment ap. 1,5 bn € p.a.), Helmholtz 
                                                           
10 p.e. The 7
th and upcoming 8
th Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development, European 
University Institue, the new founded European Institute of Innovation & Technology. 13 
 
Association (annual budget of ap. 3,5bn €), the Fraunhofer Society (ap. 1,7bn € p.a.) and the Max Planck 
Society (ap. 1,5bn € p.a.) – that are responsible for a huge amount of the top-research and Nobel-prize 
winners of the EU (for example according to the “Thomson Scientific Impact Factor” indicator the Max 
Planck Society is ranked the world’s most important institution in physics, space sciences and the 2
nd / 3
rd 
most important and influential intuition in the world related to material science, biology, biochemistry and 
molecular biology) a vast amount of European research capability and excellence is not accounted for by 
higher-education rankings. Howsoever, the research performance of these public institutes is at least on 
the same level as the performance of any American top-10 university. Altogether it can be argued, that the 
EU’s universities and research institutions are of finest international quality and that the EU has to fear no 
comparison related to this indicator, but should not stop its efforts to grow to be the region which inhabits 
the world’s finest institutions of higher education.   
 
Summary “Infrastructure”: The EU finds itself in all three indicators in either the prime spot (Fixed 
(wired) Internet subscriptions and Fixed broadband Internet subscribers), or at least among the top-tier 
entities (THE Top-200 global universities). Hence, it can be stated that the EU, in terms of innovative 
capabilities  in the category  of  infrastructure, is  equipped excellently  and  operates  at  a  high  level  of 
competitiveness.          
 
Research-Productivity 
The selected indicators put a great emphasis on the structural and commercial characteristics of scientific 
research output. They are thus closely linked to the public spending on education. The indicators of the 
number of scientific journal articles and citations measure the distribution of scientific discovery and 
knowledge. The indicator of citations possesses high structural implications by taking into account the 
quality of a journal article. This approach differs from other indexes on Innovation Capacity. The Science 
and Technology Capacity Index developed by the RAND Corporation for example “uses a co-authorship 
index as a source of information on the international integration of countries’ academia” (Archibugi and 
Coco 2005: 183; Wagner et al. 2001). A country that has a great number of both journal articles and 
citations  is  thus  able  to  dominate  and  lead  the  scientific  discourse.  The  patent  indicators  show  the 
country's capability to commercialize scientific discovery and knowledge. In contrast to other studies (p.e. 
Archibugi and Coco 2005:188; Desai et al. 2002; UNDP 2001), the patent indicators here are not used to 
illustrate technology creation, but research productivity and output as a keystone of national innovative 
capacity by linking them to the annual research and development expenditure. 
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Scientific and Technical Journal Articles and Citations 
 
 
 
 
The role of academic institutions has already been taken into account by presenting their standing within 
the global Times Higher Education University ranking. But by using the number of scientific publications 
as well as the number of citations, a greater emphasis is put on the output of scientific research – not only 
within academic research facilities, but also within public research centers. These two indicators are 
closely linked to the public spending on (higher) education (Archibugi and Coco 2005: 183). Moreover 
the indicator of scientific journal article has a wide country coverage, whereas other indicators are only 
available for a more limited sample of countries. It is also „able to account for a large portion of cross-
country variability for both industrialized as well as less developed economies“ (Castellacci 2008: 304). 
The indicator of citations is not yet available for all European Union member states due to the complex 
data selection process, but it nevertheless takes into account the global standing of emerging economies 
such as the BRIC states as well as the biggest economies within the European Union.  
The limitations for the indicator of scientific journal article may be the quality of journal articles that 
varies from country to country according to their selection process as well as the amount of English-
speaking countries that may be over-represented (Archibugi and Coco 2005: 183). For the indicator of 
citations, it is true that English journal articles are more likely to be cited than others. But the indicator of 
citation does not possess the limitation of quality that is considered the most important one of these two. 
Because the global number of citations of a journal article is counted, the quality is not only accorded to a 
national selection process, but foremost to the judging of worldwide experts that take into account the 
high quality of an article by citing them. 
 
Chart 7: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles 
 
 
Scientific journal articles 
EU and USA perform outstandingly. Japan does well and China is catching up. Brazil, India, Russia 
and SA rock bottom positions. 
Citations 
EU6 has first place, US and Japan perform well. China midfield position. Brazil, India, Russia and SA 
irrelevant.  15 
 
Figure 1: Citation 
 
 
The data on scientific and technical journal articles and citations show an immense gap between the 
European Union and the United States on the one hand and Japan as well as the BRICS states on the other 
hand. The latter are trailing far behind for both indicators. The capability of the European Union and the 
United States to publish a high number of scientific and technical journal articles can be traced back to the 
good quality of the scientific infrastructure in these countries. This has been shown by the previous 
indicators and is, among others, linked to a good standing within the global university rankings. Japan, 
despite its high-technology capabilities, is far behind the European countries and the United States. It has 
already been illustrated that Japan's low position within the THE university ranking is due to national 
investment in the higher education system that has been focused on national initiatives for too long 
(Yonezawa 2006). Apparently national research and scientific publications were also focused on national 
and regional issues and thus, did not matter within the global scientific discourse.  
The illustrated gap is maintained when considering the number of citations. Those countries with a high 
number of publications also seem to be globally recognized in terms of scientific quality. Especially the 
scientific output of the European Union seems to be of outstanding quality according to the interpretation 
of  the  citation  indicator.  In  2008,  the  researchers  in  the  European  Union  published  250,000  journal 
articles, 212,000 journal articles were published in the United States the same year. However, according 
to the counting procedure of citations, the citations of 6 member states of the European Union are almost 
twice the amount of citations of US-American scientific articles. 
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Patent fillings per 1m$ R&D expenditures and Total Number of Patent Families by Country of Origin 
 
Japan and China possess the highest research productivity and efficiency counted in patent filings per 
1Mio US$ research and development expenditure. Brazil, Russia and India are also among the leading 
countries as well as some small economies of the European Union such as Poland, Latvia or Bulgaria. 
 
 Chart 8: Patent Filings per 1m US$ R&D Expenditure 
 
 
 
Japan's standing in terms of patent family applications is excellent and China has been catching up for a 
couple of years. Its patent family applications doubled between 2005 and 2008 and passed the United 
States in 2008.  It is surprising that the United States trail behind especially in terms of patent fillings per 
1Mio US$ research and development  expenditure. The United States are commonly considered as one of 
the leading scientific nations. They are on the top of a lot of indicators measuring research productivity 
such as journal articles and citations as well as the quality of scientific infrastructure such as the THE 
World's University Ranking. But also other countries that posses a long research history and a sound 
scientific infrastructure such as the United Kingdom, Germany or the Netherlands trail behind. 
 
 
In terms of patent family applications, Brazil, Russia and India are far behind, whereas the United States, 
European countries and especially Japan have a solid standing.  
 
Patent fillings per 1m$ R&D expenditures 
China, Russia and Japan are remarkably efficient. USA and most European countries moderate.  
Total Number of Patent Families by Country of Origin  
Japan outstanding. US and EU are doing well. China is (once again) catching up. All others non-
existent.  17 
 
Chart 9: Total Number of Patent Families by Country of Origin 
 
The fact that international patent applications are typically more costly than domestic ones can serve as an 
explanation for this lower number (Grupp and Schmoch 1999). Companies that invest in a variety of 
foreign markets “would have a strong motivation to seek intellectual property protection overseas when 
the risk of its products being imitated, which depends on the technological sophistication of firms in the 
host country” (Huang and Jacob 2012: 7). The data on patent family applications illustrate that very few 
patent families created by Brazil, China and the Russia contained more than one patent office, whereas a 
great amount of patent applications by European countries, the United States or Japan include at least two 
offices: Leading high-industrialized countries seemed to protect their high-technological inventions on 
emerging markets in the past, but the Chinese catch up in terms of patent family applications illustrates 
the competitiveness of the Chinese technological advancement. 
 
Summary  “Research  Productivity”:  When  it  comes  to  the  category  of  “research  productivity”  the 
performance of the EU is ambivalent. While the EU performs very well with regard to scientific journal 
articles, citations and patents applications by country of origin, the EU’s performance regarding the total 
number of patent families by country of origin is only moderate.   
 
Global Market Performance of the European Union 
 
This last part of the paper examines the global market performance of the European Union. Global market 
performance in this regard is understood as the success in international trade (measured in terms of 
shares in commercial services and merchandise trade), the international rating of companies that are 
legally based in the entity’s territory (Forbes 2000), as well as the attractiveness and profitability of 
codified  and  applicable  knowledge  owned  by  public  or  private  actors  legally  based  in  the  political 
entity’s / state’s territory (royalty and license fees balance). All the indicators chosen in this category are 
able to measure the economic success rate and market efficiency of an entity, by looking at specific 
market-related output indicators. In difference to the category “research productivity” this category only 
focuses on indicators that are a direct expression of market usability of codified knowledge (royalty and 
license  fees  balance),  market  power  and  performance  of  companies  (Forbes  Global  2000),  or  of  an 
entity’s performance in international trade (trade in merchandise and services). Therefore, the common 
ground  of  the  indicators  selected  here  is  that  they  are  able  to  give  direct  insight  into  the  market 
performance and efficiency of an actor. Whereas the indicators of the category “research productivity” 18 
 
indeed are suitable to provide information on efficiency in relation to academic research and the use of 
resources in the process of the creation of knowledge, they are not able to give information on the market 
performance  economic  usability  of  these  works.  Looking  at  who  pays  more  for  the  use  of  others’ 
innovations and knowledge, than he receives for his own innovations and knowledge used by others 
(royalty and license fees balance), who runs the global economy in terms of economic weight and size 
(Forbes Global 2000) and who trades most (services and merchandise), gives profound insight into the 
overall  global  market  performance  of actors.  Although  it  is  not  the  aim  of  this  paper  to  establish a 
statistical or theoretical relationship between one actor’s endowment in terms of innovative capabilities 
(IC) and its global market performance (that will be the task of the authors’ future research), based on the 
authors’ remarks on the mode of action of the different indicators and their influence on an entity’s 
competitiveness, it has to be assumed that a good standing in terms of IC endowment might lead to 
superior global market performance. As shown above, the EU is in most indicators very well ranked 
regarding its innovative capabilities; hence we can also assume the EU to be well-positioned in terms of 
its global market performance, which is actually the case (as shown below).    
 
 
 
The indicator “royalty and license fee balance” is often used as a benchmark for the economic usability of 
codified and/or patented and/or copy right protected knowledge, processes and technology that originate 
in a political entity (cf. Below 2012 et al.: 15-17; UNIDO) and therefore gives an overview about the 
economic  revenue  of  applied  knowledge  and  technology,  by  showing  the  balance  of  receipts  and 
payments. Furthermore, the royalty and license fees balance gives a general idea about whose economy is 
- in economic terms - more efficient in the creation and worldwide sale of technology and knowledge.   
As we can learn from chart 10, the US and Japan are the only two actors with a positive balance in royalty 
and license fees, so in fact, those two economies are the only two on a global level that receive more fees 
from others for the use of technology/knowledge created by their economies, than they have to pay for 
using others’ knowledge etc. The EU again shows a nearly even balance rate of royalty and license fees. 
Although the EU is performing on a fair level, the economic usability of knowledge and technology 
developed in the EU is not as high as of knowledge and technology developed in the USA or Japan.  
 
Chart 10: Royalty and license fees (balance) 
 
 
On the other hand, all BRICS states are horribly positioned and have a totally negative balance of royalty 
and  license  fees.  In  plain  language,  this  means  that  on  a  global  level  nearly  nobody  uses  licensed 
knowledge  and  technology  developed  in  one  of  the  BRICS  countries,  but  the  BRICS  countries  are 
obviously (still) totally depended on foreign knowledge and technology for their production. Despite the 
Royalty and license fees balance 
USA  and  Japan  recipients.  EU  nearly  balanced.  Brazil,  Russia,  India,  China  and  SA  are  the 
paymasters.  19 
 
fact, that a lot of “analyses” and commentaries claim that the BRICS countries have become more than 
just  the  world’s  workbench,  the  careful  analysis  of  the  data  shows  that  market  competitiveness  of 
knowledge and technology developed in the BRICS countries is nothing more than a fairytale. Most of 
the products manufactured in the BRICS countries are produced under license, or just assembled in one of 
the BRICS by local companies for western companies. At least in this category the BRICS states are still 
light-years away from the level of competitiveness of the industrialized countries/entities.   
 
 
 
Another approach suitable to estimate the global market performance of an entity is to look into the global 
standing of the companies that are based in one entity’s territory. To do so, the paper uses the data of the 
Forbes Global 2000 survey and counts the global top 200 companies by entity. In general it can be 
argued, that a large number of highly profitable, valuable and top-selling companies legally based in one 
political  entity’s  territory  are  an  expression  of  the  entity’s  economy  competitiveness  and  economic 
efficiency, and furthermore one pre-condition for high tax income and wealth.  
 
Chart 11: Forbes Global 2000 – The World’s Leading Companies 
 
 
As we can learn from chart 11, the majority of the world’s leading companies are to be found in the EU 
and US. In other words, mainly US and European enterprises run the global economy. China and Japan 
are positioned in the mid-field while Brazil and Russia are in lower-class positions. Not one Indian or 
South-African enterprise is a member of the top-200 club. In terms of sales, profits, market value and 
assets American and European companies are top performers and the EU hosts most of the world’s top 
companies.  
 
 
Forbes Global 2000 
Majority of the world’s leading companies situated in the EU and US. Japan and China have fair 
positions. Brazil and Russia on the sheet. India and SA non-existent.  20 
 
Commercial services trade performance and merchandise trade performance
11 
 
In  IR  little  has  been  written  about  the  relationship  of  trade  and  power  so  far.  However,  a  good 
performance  in  international  trade  measured  in  terms  of  global  market  shares  is  believed  to  be  one 
condition for a political entity to convincingly use economic sanctions (for example Hirschman 1980). 
Furthermore, a large market on the one hand and the promise of market access on the other hand can be 
used  as  a  valuable  bargaining  chip  in  international  negotiations  (cf.  Meunier  and  Nicolaidis  2005; 
Meunier 2006 and 2007), or can be used to (often coercively) externalize market-related policies and 
regulations (Damro 2012). In addition, from an economic point of view, large shares in international trade 
are an indicator for competitiveness and economic advancement of an economy.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Commercial Services Trade Performance 
 
 
 
Based on WTO Trade Statistics Categories for commercial services the overall market performance of the 
US, China and the EU was measured, by ranking the shares of export and import in every category (1 = 
highest market shares,3 = lowest market shares in this category) and then weighting them according to 
their respective value in $, as well as their market performance in terms of import shares (1
st, 2
nd, 3
rd). The 
overall ranking for “Commercial Services Trade” (1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd rank) is therefore the rounded outcome 
of the total number of first (1), second (2) and third (3) place ratings of the US, China and the EU in those 
categories. 
Like  expressed  by  Figure  2,  the  EU  is  top  positioned  in  commercial  services  exports  and  imports, 
followed by the US and China. The European market is highly integrated in the global market and the EU 
sells and buys the largest amount of commercial services worldwide. This is one proof of the importance 
of the European market for international trade and of the high level of competitiveness of European 
products. 
                                                           
11 Note: The following two indicators are a first sneak preview of research “in progress” and therefore not fully 
tested yet. 
Commercial services trade performance 
EU top-ranking, USA second, China third.  
Source: WTO Trade Statistics 
Methodology: Based on the following 
WTO Trade Statistics Categories for 
commercial service trade: 
Transportation services, Travel, 
Communications services, 
Telecommunications services, 
Construction, Insurance services, 
Financial services, Computer and 
information services, Computer 
services, Other business services, 
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services, Audio-visual services, the 
overall market performance of the US, 
China and the EU was measured, by 
ranking the shares of export and import 
in every category (1 = highest market 
shares and 3 = lowest market shares in 
this category) and then weighting them 
according to their respective value in $, 
as well as their market performance in 
terms of import shares (1
st, 2
nd, 3
rd). The 
overall ranking for “Commercial 
Services Trade” (1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd rank) is 
therefore the outcome of the total 
number of first (1), second (2) and third 
(3) place ratings of the US, China and 
the EU in those categories.  
Note: Data for 2011. 21 
 
 
  
 
Using the same methodology like the commercial services trade performance, but using WTO categories 
for commodities of merchandise trade, the merchandise trade performance of the US, EU and China has 
been measured. In both categories (exports and imports) the EU is once again in the 1
st place regarding 
market shares and market performance.   
 
Figure 3: Merchandise Trade Performance 
 
 
 
 
Summary “Global Market Performance of the European Union”: Except for the indicator of royalty and 
license fees balance the EU is positioned in the prime spot. In international Trade the market performance 
of the EU is superior.  
Conclusion 
The  paper  has  offered  an  insight  to  the  EU's  innovation  capabilities  and  market  performance  in 
international comparison. It has answered the question of EU’s standing in international comparison and 
whether traditional powers are outrun by emerging powers. The indicators presented in this paper do not 
use  traditional  approaches  like  measuring  GDP  or  high-technological  exports,  but  rather  innovative 
measuring  of  innovative  capabilities  and  market  performance  that  focus  on  input,  output, 
commercialization and economic usability. 
The paper has presented four sections that cluster different indicators. With regard to the indicators of 
Investment & Human Capital the EU finds itself in an upper-class position, but not in one indicator in the 
prime spot. Especially in terms of tertiary education enrollment rate more efforts are needed to maintain 
competitiveness. Opposing the general public perception, the BRICS countries do not do that well in 
terms of investment and human capital as they would have to in order to catch up with, or even overtake 
the industrialized actor.  
Merchandise trade performance 
EU first, China and USA close by.  
Source: WTO Trade Statistics 
Methodology: Based on the following 
WTO Trade Statistics Categories for 
commercial service trade: 
Manufactures, Machinery and transport 
equipment, Office and telecom 
equipment, Electronic data processing 
and office equipment, Clothing, 
Telecommunications equipment, 
Textiles, Agricultural products, 
Chemicals, Food, Fuels and mining 
products, Fuels, Integrated circuits and 
electronic components, Iron and steel, 
Automotive products, Pharmaceuticals, 
the overall market performance of the 
US, China and the EU was measured, 
by ranking the shares of export and 
import in every category (1 = highest 
market shares and 3 = lowest market 
shares in this category) and then 
weighting them according to their 
respective value in $, as well as their 
market performance in terms of import 
shares (1
st, 2
nd, 3
rd). The overall ranking 
for “Commercial Services Trade” (1
st, 
2
nd and 3
rd rank) is therefore the 
outcome of the total number of first (1), 
second (2) and third (3) place ratings of 
the US, China and the EU in those 
categories.  
Note: Data for 2011. 22 
 
For the indicators of the category Infrastructure it can be stated that the EU is excellently equipped and 
operates at a high level of competitiveness. The same can be said about the outcome of the Research 
Productivity indicators, except for the EU’s performance regarding the total number of patent families by 
country of origin, which is only moderate. Except for the indicator of royalty and license fees balance the 
EU is positioned in the prime spot and its market performance in international trade is superior. 
The United States and the European Union lead the international community in terms of innovation 
capabilities and market performance. This is due to well-directed investments and policies during the last 
years as well as their long research tradition that offers a large body of experience and international 
reputation. The EU’s capabilities to compete and its rank in international economic affairs, based on latest 
data, are outstanding. 
Quite interestingly the positioning of the BRICS is weak in nearly all indicators presented. Even China’s 
position (despite her international importance in terms of trade and economic issues) is not as good as it 
might have assumed to be in the context of the ongoing debate of a power shift between China and the 
EU/USA. Opposing the general public perception, this paper has also shown that the BRICS countries do 
not do that well in terms of investment and human capital, infrastructure and research productivity as they 
would have to do to catch up with, or even overtake the industrialized actors. India and South Africa 
perform badly and there has been no progress over the last years. Brazil on the other hand shows some 
progress in  most  of  the indicators. The  poor  and  very  inhomogeneous  overall  results  of the  BRICS 
countries’ performances also question the BRIC(S) concept and ongoing debate about a perceived power 
shift more generally/fundamental and open up the need for further research on these questions (that we 
will deal with in an upcoming paper). The even worse performance of South-Africa compared to the other 
BRICS states is also a matter which has to be addressed separately in a future paper. 
 Summing up, this paper has evidently and forcefully shown that the European Union ranks in many of 
the indicators related to innovative capabilities in good/very good position and the EU’s overall global 
market performance is excellent, whereas the BRICS underachieve. Despite the challenges the EU faces 
today, it becomes obvious that the good standing of the EU is owed to the fact that the EU is regarded in 
its  entirety,  which  should  provide  another  argument  for  further  European  integration. 23 
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